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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

l

Plaintiff-Respondent, it
V

Case No. 870569-CA

1

l

V •

1t

STEVEN FISHER,
Defendant-Appellant.

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the denial of defendant's motion
to withdraw his guilty plea, and from his conviction of theft
under Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404. Defendant's motion to withdraw
his guilty plea was denied on September 24, 1987 (R. 27).
Defendant's judgment and commitment were filed on November 16,
1987. (R. 32,33).
Defendant'8 notice of appeal of both the denial of his
motion to withdraw the guilty plea and of his conviction was
filed on November 19, 1987 in the trial court (R. 36). On
December 4, 1987, the Utah Supreme Court transferred this case to
this Court (R. 41).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Did defendant waive his opportunity to challenge the
use of a polygraph as the -basis of the plea bargain" by omitting
this argument in the proceedings for plea withdrawal before the
trial court?

2. Would it have been an abuse of discretion for the
trial court to reject defendant's argument now made on appeal, if
the argument had been raised during defendant's proceedings for
the withdrawal of his guilty plea?
3. Does the record provided support defendant's claims
that the polygraph results were somehow unfair or deceptive?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS STATUTES AND RULES
Determinative statutes and constitutional provisions
are set out in full in the appendix to this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information, signed on April
21, 1987, with theft, a second degree felony, as defined in Utah
Code Ann. S 76-6-404. (R. 2). Defendant was arraigned in circuit
court on April 21, 1987, and preliminary hearing was scheduled on
May 19, 1987, at which time defendant waived his right to a
preliminary hearing, and defendant was then bound over to the
district court (R. 7, 9).
On June 1, 1987, defendant pleaded guilty to a reduced
charge of theft, a third degree felony, under Utah Code Ann.
$ 76-6-404. (R. 17). Defendant signed an affidavit detailing his
understanding of the rights he was waiving by entering his plea
of guilty (R. 11-16).
Defendant'8 affidavit also detailed an agreement
between himself and the State, which agreement involved
defendant's submission to a polygraph examination after his
entrance of his guilty plea (R. 11-15).

The agreement provided

that if the results of the polygraph test indicated that
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defendant were telling the truth when he claimed that he had not
participated in the theft, the theft charge against defendant
would be dismissed, and the State would consent to the withdrawal
of defendant'8 guilty plea; if the results of defendant's
polygraph test were inconclusive as to his truthfulness in
claiming that he had not participated in the theft, he would have
thirty days in which to move for the withdrawal of his guilty
plea; and if the polygraph test indicated that defendant were
lying when he claimed that he had not participated in the theft,
the guilty plea would stand, and defendant would pay $12, 050.19
in restitution (R. 13-14, 17). The State of Utah agreed to
abstain from filing additional charges of theft and embezzlement
in exchange for payment of restitution by defendant (R. 13). The
entrance of defendant's guilty plea was conditioned on the trial
court's acceptance of the polygraph agreement (R. 14).
On August 3, 1987, the trial court indicated in a
minute entry that the prosecution had indicated that defendant
"failed the polygraph testM, and the court then stated that
defendant's guilty plea would stand (R. 18).
On September 24, 1987, Judge Wilkinson denied
defendant's motion to set aside the guilty plea (R. 27). That
motion was based on three arguments:
a) That Defendant was not sufficiently
apprised that his former attorney, Grant W.
Morrison, had agreed to additional
restitution of $12, 050.19, and other, which
included other alleged embezzlements besides
the one charged.
b) That Defendant was told that he did not
fail the polygraph but that it was or could
be said to be inconclusive and that the plea
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negotiation was that the case would be
dismissed if Defendant passes the polygraph
examination.
c) That in accordance with said plea
negotiation, no polygraph examination was
conducted concerning the alleged series of
embezzlements by the Defendant.
(R. 21-22).
The trial court's judgment and commitment was entered
on November 16, 1987 (R. 32-33).

Defendant was initially

sentenced on November 2, 1987, to 0-5 years in the Utah State
Prison and a $5,000 fine, but that sentence was later suspended,
on the conditions that defendant complete eighteen months of
probation, serve ten days in the county jail, perform three
hundred hours of community service, and pay $12,050.19 in
restitution (R. 31).
Defendant's notice of appeal from the denial and from
the judgment and conviction was filed on November 19, 1987.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The information in this case reads, in part, as
follows:
The undersigned Terry L. Christiansen
under oath states on information and belief
that the defendant(s) committed the crime(s)
of: THEFT, in violation of Title 76, Chapter
6, Section 404, UCA 1953, as amended, a
Second Degree Felony, as follows, to wit:
That on or about the 26th day of March,
1985, in Summit County, State of Utah, the
defendant, Steven Michael Fisher, obtained or
exercised unauthorized control over the
property of Yarrow Associates with a purpose
to deprive Yarrow Associates of said property
and that the value of said property was more
than $1,000.00.
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(R. 2). The facts alleged in the information are somewhat
modified by defendant's affidavit in paragraph 12:
•.. I ... ask the Court to accept my plea
of guilty to the charge set forth in this
Affidavit because I did, in fact on the 26th
day of March, 1985, obtain or exercise
unauthorized control over the property of
Yarrow associates, with a purpose to deprive
Yarrow Associates of said property and that
the value of said property was more than
$250.00, but did not exceed $1,000.00.
(R. 14-15).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. Defendant waived his opportunity to challenge the
use of a polygraph as the "basis of the plea bargain" by omitting
this argument in the proceedings for plea withdrawal before the
trial court.
2. It would not have been an abuse of discretion for
the trial court to reject defendant's argument now made on
appeal, if the argument had been raised during defendant's
proceedings for the withdrawal of his guilty plea.
3. The record provided does not support defendant's
claims that the polygraph results were somehow unfair or
deceptive.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS OPPORTUNITY TO CHALLENGE
THE USE OF A POLYGRAPH AS THE "BASIS OF THE
PLEA AGREEMENT".
As noted above in the Statement of the Case,
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was based on three
arguments:
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a) That Defendant was not sufficiently
apprised that his former attorney, Grant W.
Morrison, had agreed to additional
restitution of $12, 050.19, and other, which
included other alleged embezzlements besides
the one charged.
b) That Defendant was told that he did not
fail the polygraph but that it was or could
be said to be inconclusive and that the plea
negotiation was that the case would be
dismissed if Defendant passes the polygraph
examination.
c) That in accordance with said plea
negotiation, no polygraph examination was
conducted concerning the alleged series of
embezzlements by the Defendant.
(R. 21-22).
No fair reading of these arguments can lead to the
conclusion that the lower court was given the opportunity to
decide, as defendant now asks this Court to decide, whether or
not defendant's plea was entered involuntarily because he did not
understand the polygraph (Hthe reliance of the device by the
defendant was not properly explained to him" (A.B. 5)).
To allow defendant to succeed in resting his appeal on
this new argument, which was never presented to the trial court,
would ignore Utah precedent on waiver, and the policies of
finality and division of labor among the courts behind those
precedents.

See State v. Loe, 732 P.2d 115, 117 (Utah 1987)

(defendant cannot claim for the first time on appeal that
statements made to police officer were involuntary);

Jaramillo

v. Turner, 465 P.2d 343, 344 (Utah 1970) (waiver rule is
ordinarily applicable in plea context); State v. Kelbach, 461
P.2d 297, 301 (Utah 1969) (defendants, who objected at trial to
the legality of police procedure in administering paraffin tests,
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but who did not object to the reliability of those tests at
trial, were barred from raising the latter issue on appeal); In
the Interest of Oaks, 571 P.2d 1364, 1365 (Utah 1977) (defendant,
who failed to challenge the reliability of the results of a
breathalyzer tests at trial, could not raise the issue on
appeal); State v, Tucker, 709 P.2d 313 (Utah 1985) (defendant may
not argue the constitutionality of his pre-trial show-up on
appeal without having raised the issue at trial); State v,
Valdez, 432 P.2d 53, 55 (Utah 1967) (it is improper to change
grounds for objections on appeal, after losing on different
grounds at trial); State v. Chancellor, 704 P.2d 579, 580 (Utah
1985) (defendant cannot attack probable cause for his arrest for
the first time on appeal); City of St. George v. Gubler, 569 P.2d
1099, 1100 (Utah 1977) (constitutional right to counsel could not
be addressed on appeal because issue was not raised before trial
court); State v. Sparks, 672 P.2d 92, 94 (Utah 1983) (failure to
address issue of limited cross-examination on the record
precluded appellate review of the issue); State v. Lancaster, 665
P.2d 1296, 1297 (Utah 1983) (Under the old Utah Rule of Evidence
4, court would not reach issue of constitutionality of the
implied consent law for those suspected of driving under the
influence, because the defendant failed to provide a trial
transcript, and the court could not tell whether the objection
had been made to the trial court).
The State submits that this Court should dismiss this
appeal on the basis of defendant's waiver of argument to the
trial court.
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POINT II
IT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO REJECT DEFENDANT'S
ARGUMENT NOW MADE ON APPEAL, IF THE ARGUMENT
HAD BEEN RAISED DURING DEFENDANT'S PROCEEDINGS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF HIS GUILTY PLEA.
For purposes of argument only, and in the event that
this Court deems it appropriate to address the merits in this
case, the State will assume a hypothetical: that defendant's
argument that his plea was entered involuntarily as a result of
his failure to understand the polygraph test, was presented to
the trial court, who concluded that the argument did not
constitute good cause for the withdrawal of the plea.
This Court's standard of review of a trial court's
denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea is set
forth in State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah App. 1988):
Utah Code Ann. S 77-13-6 (1982) states, in
part, MA plea of guilty . . . may be
withdrawn only upon good cause shown with
leave of court." We will not interfere with
a trial judge's determination that a
defendant has failed to show good cause
unless it clearly appears that the trial
judge abused his discretion. State v.
Mildenhall, 747 P.2d 422, 423 (Utah 1987).
Id. at 93.

Had the trial court in the instant case been faced

with defendant's argument on appeal, he would have been well
within his discretion in concluding that the argument does not
constitute good cause for withdrawal of the plea.
In State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah App.
1988), this Court found that the Utah Supreme Court, in State v.
Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), replaced the -record as a
whole" test for evaluating the validity of the entrance of guilty
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pleas with a "strict Rule 11(e) compliance test".

Vasilacopulos

at 94. This Court statedi
In its statement of law, the Gibbons Court
held, "Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial
courts the burden of ensuring that
constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements
are complied with when a guilty plea is
entered." j^d. Trial courts may not rely on
defense counsel or executed affidavits to
satisfy the specific requirements of Rule
11(e). Id. at 1313. Rather, with or without
an affidavit or defense counsel's advice, the
trial court must conduct an on-the-record
review with defendant of the Rule 11(e)
requirements. jUl. at 1314.
Vasilacopulos at 94.
Defendant seeks to bring this case under Utah R. Crim.
P. Rule 11(e) under subsection (2), which deals with the
voluntariness of the entrance of the plea, by drawing an analogy
between Vasilacopulos and the instant case - just as
Vasilacopulos's failure to understand the possibility of the
imposition of consecutive sentences rendered the entrance of his
guilty plea involuntary, defendant's failure to understand the
polygraph in the instant case rendered the entrance of his guilty
plea involuntary.

He contends that he should have been "advised

as to the nature and possible unreliability of the polygraph"
(A.B. 4), and "advised . . . of the fact that he had the right to
have the examination conducted according to certain standards, or
his right to a hearing and a finding as to if his results fell
into which [sic] category of the plea agreement," (A.B. 6), but
cites no authority for these propositions.
The State can find no authority requiring that
defendants entering conditional pleas be given such advice about
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the collateral effects of their plea bargains (i.e. Should the
defendants in State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), and
in State v. Geer 96 Ut. Adv. Rep. 24 (Utah App. 1988) have been
advised as to the "nature and possible unreliability" of
appellate review?

Should the defendant in State v, Kayf 717 P.2d

1294 (Utah 1986)/ have been advised as to the nature of life
imprisonment?).

Caselaw indicates the contrary.

See e.g., State

v. Music, 698 P.2d 1087, 1091 (Wash.App. 1985) (Defendant's claim
that his plea was entered involuntarily because he was not
informed of the guidelines used by the Board of Prison Terms and
Paroles in setting his sentence was rejected by the court: "[T]he
State correctly points out that a defendant need only be advised
of all the direct consequences of a plea, and not possible
collateral consequences").
Even if there were such a requirement for the trial
court to insure that defendant understood the collateral effects
of his plea agreement, defendant presents no record facts to
support his argument that he failed to understand the polygraph,
and thereby fails to meet his burden of proof in challenging the
trial court's hypothetical actions.

See Mayne v. Turner, 468

P.2d 369, 371 (Utah 1970) (to overcome presumption that trial
court was correct in authorizing the entrance of the guilty plea,
defendant must show that he was clearly prejudiced by a denial of
his constitutional rights).

Through his choice not to include

the transcripts from the trial court, he has deprived the State
and this Court the opportunity of finding any evidence to support
his claim.

Absent defendant's provision of an adequate record to
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evaluate his claim, this Court should deny him relief.

See

Bennett Leasing Company v. Ellison, 387 P.2d 246, 247 (Utah 1963)
("In the absence of a transcript of the evidence we are obliged
to assume that it would support the findings."); First Federal
Savings and Loan v. Schamanekf 684 P.2d 1257, 1266 (Utah 1984)
("An appellant has the obligation to provide an adequate record
on appeal for reviewing a trial judge's ruling.

In the absence

of a record, we must, and in this case do, presume that the trial
court's rulings are correct."); Smith v. Vuicich, 699 P.2d 763,
765 (Utah 1985) ("Where the record before us is incomplete, we
are unable to review the evidence as a whole and must therefore
presume that the verdict was supported by admissible and
competent evidence.").
If defendant had presented the argument he now presents
on appeal to the trial court during his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea, the trial court would not have committed a clear
abuse of discretion in denying the motion.
POINT III
THE RECORD PROVIDED DOES NOT SUPPORT
DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS THAT THE POLYGRAPH RESULTS
WERE SOMEHOW UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE.
Defendant makes much of the fact that the plea was
conditioned on an "a posteriori" polygraph.

A posteriori is

defined in Webster's New International Dictionary, unabridged
Second Edition of 1938 as "... b Designating, or pertaining to,
what cannot be known except from experience.•.".

The majority of

conditional pleas are conditioned on "a posteriori" events, such
as appellate review of an evidentiary dispute.
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See e.g., State

v, Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah 1988) (no contest plea
conditioned on appeal of suppression issue is acceptable), and
cases cited therein.
The fact that it is permissible for a trial court to
approve as the condition for the entrance of a plea something
other than the appellate resolution of an evidentiary dispute is
demonstrated by State v. Kayf 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah 1986), where
the Utah Supreme Court approved a guilty plea conditioned on the
trial court's sentencing defendant to life in prison, as opposed
to the imposing the death penalty.

The Kay court held that

-neither the statute governing the sentencing of capital felons
nor Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure prevented Kay
from entering and the trial judge from accepting the conditional
plea presented here.-

Id. at 1296.

See also, Gardner v. State,

537 P.2d 469, 472 (Nev. 1975) (initial plea bargain provided that
"the prosecution would pay [defendant's] counsel fees, pay his
back wages, and notify the press of his innocence.

The promise

was conditioned upon Gardner's passing the polygraph test.")•
Defendant complains that -there is no judicial review
of the results- of the polygraph, (A.B. 4), and complains that
the plea bargain in his case failed to meet the standards for
stipulations to admission of polygraph results set forth in State
v. Reberteranof 681 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1984).

What defendant fails

to recognize is that he did have an opportunity for judicial
review of his polygraph at the hearing on his motion to withdraw
his guilty plea.

That was also the proper forum for discussing

the questionable applicability of Reberterano in this context.
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Defendant directs the Court's attention to R. 26, the
Polygraph Examination Report, claiming that the -6 deceptive
score, the -3 inconclusive score, and the aggregate score of -6
(deceptive) indicate "Deception pursuant to the negotiated plea
agreement". (A.B. 7). While the omission of defendant's argument
at the trial level and defendant's choice not to include a
transcript of the proceedings below deprive this Court of a
technical explanation of the scores, reference to the Polygraph
Examination Report and defendant's affidavit demonstrates that
defendant received the benefits of his bargain.

Even if the

aggregate score should have been a -4 1/2 or some other figure
between the -3 and the -6, the result would not have been a
figure representing defendant's truthfulness, but only an
inconclusive score. (R. 26 on back).

Under the plea agreement,

had defendant received an inconclusive score, he was entitled to
move to withdraw his plea, which is exactly what he did in this
case. (R. 14; 21-22).

His argument that his score was only "one

point over the scale of conclusive versus inconclusive" (A.B. 6)
should be rejected on the same grounds.
Defendant's claims that the polygraph questions were
"formulated in a cumbersome manner because the defendant was a
manager", and that the questions were "indirect" and "covered
legitimate activities of employment" (R. 6), are belied by
reference to the Polygraph Examination Report, which provides the
only available samples of the questions asked:
Regarding the theft at the Yarrow-Holiday
Inn do you intend to tell the truth to each
question about that?
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Did you take any money not legally yours
from the Yarrow-Holiday Inn?
Did you recieve [sic] checks from patrons
and not post the checks on company records?
Did you deposit any unposted checks to
cover monies you had taken?
(R. 26).
Defendant'8 allegations and implications that the
polygraph results in this case were somehow unfair or deceptive
are contradicted by the record he designated for appeal.
CONCLUSION
The State submits that this Court need not reach the
merits of this appeal because defendant waived his opportunity to
attack the propriety of conditioning a guilty plea on a polygraph
examination when he failed to make that argument to the trial
court in his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
If this Court reaches the merits of this case, it
should uphold the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.
authorized under Utah law.

Conditional plea bargains are
There is no authority for the

proposition that the trial court should have insured defendant's
understanding of the polygraph test, no evidence that defendant
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failed to understand the polygraph, and no evidence that the plea
agreement was not fulfilled in a fair and complete manner.
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